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We assess quantitatively the eﬀect of exogenous health improvements on output per capita.
Our simulation model allows for a direct eﬀect of health on worker productivity, as well as in-
direct eﬀects that run through schooling, the size and age-structure of the population, capital
accumulation, and crowding of ﬁxed natural resources. The model is parameterized using a
combination of microeconomic estimates, data on demographics, disease burdens, and natural
resource income in developing countries, and standard components of quantitative macroeco-
nomic theory. We consider both changes in general health, proxied by improvements in life
expectancy, and changes in the prevalence of two particular diseases: malaria and tuberculosis.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of health improvements on income per capita are substantially lower
than those that are often quoted by policy-makers, and may not emerge at all for three decades
or more after the initial improvement in health. The results suggest that proponents of eﬀorts
to improve health in developing countries should rely on humanitarian rather than economic
arguments.
Keywords: Health, Human capital, Life expectancy, Disease eradication, Fertility, Population
size, Age structure, Capital accumulation, Natural resources, Income per capita
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E17, I12, J11, J13, J21, J24, O11, O13
∗We thank the editors, discussants, and conference participants of the NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2008 for
m a n yu s e f u lc o m m e n t s . D a r o nA c e m o g l up r o v i d e dd e t a i l e dc o m m e n t so na ne a r l i e rd r a f t . W ea l s ot h a n ks e m i n a r
participants at Banco d’Espana, the Brown Macro Lunch, Dartmouth College, the Harvard Program on the Global
Demography of Aging, the International Monetary Fund, the San Francisco Fed, Tufts University, the UAPS Fifth
African Population Conference, and Williams College for comments. Financial support from the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Jeﬀrey Kang, Bryce Millett, Ishani Tewari, and Joshua Wilde
provided superlative research assistance.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Chronic ill-health and the prospect of premature mortality haunt billions of people around the
developing world. Few goals can be more worthy than that of ameliorating these burdens. Today,
there exists a widespread belief that signiﬁcant improvements in health are within reach of aﬀordable
policy interventions, whether led by governments or by large-scale philanthropies. There also exists
a widespread consensus that improving the health of people in poor countries will lead to signiﬁcant
economic gains. The prospect of such economic beneﬁts is often cited as an important secondary
justiﬁcation for health initiatives. For example, the report of the Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health (2001), chaired by Jeﬀrey Sachs, ﬁnds evidence that health is one of the most important
determinants of a country’s economic success. Similarly, the Abuja Declaration of 2005, signed by
ﬁfty three African heads of state, notes that “malaria has slowed economic growth in African
countries by 1.3% per year as a result of which GDP for African countries is now 37% lower than
it would have been in the absence of malaria.”1
In this paper we assess the claim that improvements in health lead to increases in eco-
nomic growth. Our ﬁndings are not supportive of the popularly held view. We ﬁnd that large
improvements in health lead, in the long run, to modest increases in GDP per capita. Further,
these increases in GDP per capita take several decades to arrive. Controlling speciﬁcd i s e a s e st h a t
have a high burden in developing countries would also produce small eﬀects. For example, we ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of eradicating malaria in a typical sub-Saharan country would be to raise GDP per
capita by only about two percent in the long run. Our evidence thus suggests that proponents of
eﬀorts to improve health in developing countries should rely on humanitarian rather than economic
arguments.
Existing research on the eﬀects of health on economic outcomes uses data at both the micro-
economic (household) and macroeconomic (country) level. Microeconomists have found extensive
evidence that an individual’s health is an important determinant of his or her economic perfor-
mance. Various measures of poor health, including malnutrition, anemia, and exposure to disease
in utero and during childhood, have all been shown to have a negative eﬀect on a person’s wages
or productivity. At the macroeconomic level, there is a strong positive correlation between income
per capita and life expectancy or other measures of health. Thus there is a prima facie case for
believing that health improvements will make a country richer.
Drawing a macroeconomic conclusion directly from either the microeconomic evidence or the
cross-sectional correlation is problematic, however. Outcomes of microeconomic studies are often
measured in units that do not map immediately into macroeconomic eﬀects. More importantly,
microeconomic studies are unable to control for general equilibrium eﬀects of changes in population
health. For example, an increase in life expectancy may lead to a larger population, in turn reducing
available resources per capita and possibly undoing the economic beneﬁts of better health. On the
other hand, macroeconomic cross-country regressions that could potentially capture these eﬀects
1See Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Weil (2007) for more discussion of this literature.
1typically suﬀer from omitted variables bias and reverse causation problems. In an important recent
study, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) conclude that, when the problems of health’s endogeneity
and omitted variables are corrected, health improvements in the period after World War II actually
had a negative eﬀect on income per capita.
Our goal in this paper is to answer the macroeconomic question of how much national income
can be raised by exogenous health improvements by building up from microeconomic estimates,
using a simulation model. Our model requires the speciﬁcation of three sets of functional relation-
ships and parameters: those involving the eﬀect of health on labor productivity and other aspects
of human capital; those involving the demographic response to health and mortality changes; and
those involving the aggregate production function. Relative to reduced-form econometrics, our
methodology is well suited to highlighting the causal mechanisms behind changes in output per
capita, and therefore by implication which sets of policies or behavioral variables are likely to have
a quantitatively signiﬁcant eﬀect on the relationship between health and income.
We apply the model to two distinct types of exogenous changes in health. The ﬁrst is an
increase in life expectancy, treating life expectancy as a summary measure of the general state of
health in a nation. In particular, we consider the eﬀect of exogenously raising life expectancy at
birth from 40 to 60 years. This approximately corresponds with the most dramatic improvement
in health observed during the international epidemiological transition studied by Acemoglu and
Johnson. The key ﬁnding from these simulations is that even large increases in life expectancy,
which could raise per capita income in the long run by around 15 percent, may reduce income by
up to 5 percent for 30-40 years or more after the shock.
The second type of change in health we consider is the eradication of particular diseases.
Our results focus on two infectious diseases that are particularly prevalent in the developing world:
malaria and tuberculosis. These simulations have two key results. The ﬁrst is that, for either of the
diseases considered, even complete eradication has a relatively small impact on income per capita
in either the short or the long run, not exceeding a few percentage points. The second is that these
relatively small eﬀects vary by disease. For example, in the short run, eradicating tuberculosis
raises income per capita whereas eradicating malaria lowers it. The diﬀerent eﬀects on income of
eradicating these diseases arise largely because tuberculosis strikes mostly prime-age workers, while
malaria aﬀects mainly young children.
The simulation-based methodology allows us to take into account both general equilibrium
eﬀects and the dynamic eﬀect of health through channels including the evolution of the size and
age-structure of the population, capital accumulation, and resource crowding. The analysis is
well adapted to considering the dynamic path of the economy over the course of this evolution,
rather than merely comparing steady states, and to providing a quantitative characterization of
this evolution in the face of particular interventions. The simulation approach also permits analysis
of the strength of the various mechanisms at work. For instance, it is straightforward to examine
the sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent estimates of the eﬀect of disease on eﬀective labor supply
2or the speed of the demographic transition.
Our exercise should not be mistaken for an analysis of the welfare impacts of health improve-
ments. The primary beneﬁts from health improvements are in terms of lives saved and suﬀering
avoided. The issue we study — whether there are also eﬀects on income per capita — is of minor
importance in welfare terms. Similarly, while it might be interesting to ask whether health improve-
ments of the sort that we study could be “self-ﬁnancing,” we do not go down this path. Among
other things, we do not have any estimate of the cost of the health improvements we consider, nor
do we specify who (government, households, etc.) are paying for them.
Am o r ep r o ﬁtable use of the analysis, in our view, is to suggest policies that are comple-
mentary to health improvements in terms of raising income per capita. We see three areas where
this is particularly relevant. First, we ﬁnd that health improvements can result in large population
increases that can have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on income per capita over an extended period.
Providing women with suﬃcient knowledge of, and access to, a range of family-planning options
may ameliorate this eﬀect. Second, one important channel through which population increases
reduce income per capita is capital shallowing. Therefore policies and institutions that enable a
sizable and sustained current account deﬁcit without incurring unduly high interest burdens, are
likely to be particularly important following an increase in life expectancy. Finally, many or most
health interventions have the largest eﬀect on infant mortality, and therefore are likely to lead to
a substantial increase in the number of children. Since increased human capital formation is likely
to be optimal following an improvement in health, and is an important factor oﬀsetting population
pressure, it is particularly important to ensure an adequate supply of teachers and school facilities
in the years following public health improvements.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section Two presents the model and discusses
our choice of base case parameters. Section Three presents simulation results for the base case
model, and then discusses the sensitivity of results to altering our parameter assumptions. In
Section Four, we consider the eradication of two speciﬁc diseases: malaria and tuberculosis. We
discuss how the model has to be altered and present simulation results. Section Five concludes.
2 The Model and its Parameterization
Health aﬀects income through a number of channels, and the dynamics of these eﬀects can be
stretched out over several decades. Thus, analyzing the eﬀect of a health intervention entails
comparing the complete paths of income and other endogenous variables in the scenario in which
the intervention takes place to an alternative in which it does not. Similarly, alternative parameter
assumptions regarding the diﬀerent components of the model will yield diﬀerent dynamic paths of
all the endogenous variables.
We consider two diﬀerent sorts of health interventions. First, we consider a “general” health
improvement. Speciﬁcally, we consider a shift in life expectancy at birth from e0 =4 0to e0 =6 0
3using a model life table. Second, we consider the eradication of two speciﬁc diseases: malaria and
tuberculosis.
The model features both demographic and economic elements. The demographic elements
comprise estimates of mortality and fertility by age. The economic elements include the speciﬁcation
of the aggregate production function and the speciﬁcation of the response of variables such as human
capital to changes in health. We consider each element in turn.
2.1 Demographic Structure
The demographic part of the model takes age-speciﬁc mortality and fertility schedules as inputs.
Figures 1 and 2 show the data that we use for analyzing a general health improvement. Figure
1 shows the probability of survival to diﬀerent ages at life expectancies of 40 (before the health
improvement) and 60 (after the improvement), using the female model life table for the South
Asia region from the United Nations (1982).2 Figure 2 shows age-speciﬁc fertility data for Sri
Lanka in 1953 from Keyﬁtz and Flieger (1968), which we take as a measure of fertility before
the general health improvement. These data are among the earliest available and should capture
much of the relevant demographic behavior over the period considered by Acemoglu and Johnson
(2007). In practice, population is divided into 5-year age groups, and each time period in our model
corresponds to ﬁve years.
We assume that prior to the health improvement, fertility and mortality rates have been
constant for long enough that the population is stable (that is, the relative sizes of diﬀerent age
groups are constant as is the growth rate of the population). The health improvement switches the
country immediately to the new mortality schedule.3 A critical component of the model is what
happens to fertility rates when mortality changes. We assume that in the long run, fertility adjusts
proportionally at each age such that the growth rate of the population eventually returns to its
pre-shock level. We further assume that the adjustment in age-speciﬁc fertility occurs in a linear
fashion over some transition period.
Estimates of the appropriate length of this fertility transition period are diﬃcult to come
by. We assume as a base case a transition period of 50 years. This fertility adjustment is a little
slower than some accounts of the East Asian demographic transition, which suggest a period of
2For simplicity, our demographic projections are performed on a closed, female-only population. Considering a
population of both males and females, however, would not qualitatively alter the results of our model as long as the
sex-ratio-at-birth remains ﬁxed over time.





b · Nt if t<T
P
a · Nt otherwise,
where P
b and P
a are the n×n projection matrices before and after the shock, N0 > 0 is given, and the shock period,
T, is determined to occur after the pre-shock population has attained a stable age structure and rate of growth.
A population projection matrix is composed of age-speciﬁc net maternity rates along the ﬁrst row and age-speciﬁc
survivorship rates along the sub-diagonal. The stable population growth rate implied by a projection matrix is given
by its largest, real eigenvalue, and the stable age-structure by the corresponding eigenvector.
4about 25—30 years, but seems quite consistent with evidence from Europe and India and perhaps
even a little optimistic in Africa (see Lee et al. (2001) for a brief summary of the evidence). Below
we test the sensitivity of our results to diﬀerent assumptions regarding the length of the transition
period. When we consider the eradication of a speciﬁc diseases in Section Four, we use a table of
age-speciﬁc deaths from that disease to create a cause-deleted mortality schedule and make similar
assumptions about the response of fertility to mortality decline.
Figure 3 shows the sizes of the overall population and of the working-age and dependent-
age segments of the population, all relative to the baseline in which no improvement in health
takes place. Population in the health improvement scenario stabilizes at roughly 1.5 times the size
of the baseline (note that population is growing at an annual rate of 1.5 percent in the baseline
case; growth reaches 2.5 percent in the decade following the health improvement). Because of
demographic momentum, this stabilization takes longer than the 50 years that we assume it takes
fertility to adjust. For the ﬁrst 40 years of the transition, the ratio of dependents to working-age
adults is higher in the health improvement scenario than in the baseline. This eﬀect peaks about
15 years after the shock, at which time the dependency ratio has increased by about 0.10, from
about 0.69 to about 0.79. Thereafter, the dependency ratio gradually declines to a long-run level
of about 0.64. In the long run, therefore, there is a demographic dividend in terms of income per
capita from the decline in mortality, but this only occurs more than half a century after the shock.
2.2 Production and Physical Capital Accumulation
In our base case model, aggregate production is given by a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function. The factor inputs are land (which we use as a shorthand for all ﬁxed factors of production),





where α + β ≤ 1, X is a ﬁxed arbitrary stock of land and At is productivity.
We assume fairly standard values for factor shares: we set α =0 .3 and β =0 .6, meaning
that the implied share of land is 10 percent. In a later section we revisit the role of ﬁxed factors of
production. We consider the sensitivity of our results to both the share of land in national income
and the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors of production. We also examine
data on natural resource shares of national income.
Productivity grows at an exogenous rate that does not respond to any of the changes in the
model. For convenience, the growth rate is set to equal the steady-state rate of population growth
times the share of land, so that income per capita is constant in the steady state. Because all of
our results entail a comparison of income in the case of a health intervention to the case where no
intervention takes place, the underlying rate of technological change is of very little importance.
We handle capital accumulation extremely simply, by making the Solovian assumption that
5a ﬁxed share of national income is saved in each period.4 Accordingly, the stock of capital in period
t, Kt, evolves over time according to:
Kt+1 = sYt +( 1− δ)Kt,
where s and δ are the ﬁxed saving and depreciation rates, respectively. We assume that the annual
savings rate is 10 percent, which is close to the average for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and
assign a standard value to the depreciation rate of ﬁve percent. Below we also consider the case of
an economy open to international capital ﬂows.
2.3 Human Capital
We model an individual’s human capital as a function of his or her schooling, experience, and
health. We assume that human capital inputs of individuals with diﬀerent characteristics are











where Ni,t is the number of individuals of age i in the population in period t. W ea s s u m et h a t
children enter the labor force at 15 and workers leave the labor force at 65.
Our treatment of schooling and experience is standard. Years of schooling are aggregated






exp[θ1S] if S ≤ 4
exp[4θ1 + θ2(S − 4)] if 4 <S≤ 8
exp[4θ1 +4 θ2 + θ3(S − 8)] if S>8
w h e r ew eu s ev a l u e so fθ1 =0 .134, θ2 =0 .101,a n dθ3 =0 .068, based on Hall and Jones (1999). The
return to schooling will be relevant for the exercises we conduct because improvements in health
will raise the average level of schooling.




i,t =e x p [ φ(i − 15) + ψ(i − 15)2]
where, based on Bils and Klenow (2000), who provide an estimate of the average return to experience
in a sample of 48 countries, we use a φ value of 0.0495 and a value of -0.0007 for ψ.E x p e r i e n c ew i l l
play a role in our simulations because declines in m o r t a l i t ya n df e r t i l i t yw i l ll e a dt oap o p u l a t i o n
with higher average age and thus higher average experience.
4Young (2005) makes the same assumption in his analysis of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. An alternative would
be to build in a life-cycle model of saving, although there is considerable controversy about the applicability of such
models to developing countries. See Lee et al. (2001) and Deaton (1999).
62.3.1 Human Capital from Health
We use two diﬀerent methods for parameterizing the eﬀects of a general health improvement (that
is, an increase in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60) on human capital.
The ﬁrst method for modeling the eﬀect of a general improvement in health uses the estimate
of the eﬀect of increased adult survival rates (ASR) on productivity generated in Weil (2007), which
in turn draws on a large number of well-identiﬁed microeconomic studies. The ASR is deﬁned as
the probability that an individual will attain the age of 60, conditional on having attained the age
of 15 using the current life table. Weil estimates the structural coeﬃcient linking the log of human
capital in the form of health to ASR as 0.653. To give a concrete example of the size of this eﬀect,
a change in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60 corresponds, using the UN female model life
table for the South Asia region, to a change in the ASR from 0.50 to 0.72. Applying the coeﬃcient
above implies an increase of 15 percent in health human capital per worker.
The second method of capturing the direct eﬀect of health improvements on productivity
relies on the ratings of disease incidence and severity that are used to construct estimates of years
lost due to disability (YLD) around the world by the World Health Organization (WHO). The
WHO provides a general measure of YLDs and then also measures disease-speciﬁcY L D s ,b o t h
broken down by age group. A country’s YLD for a given disease is constructed as:
YL D= I × DW × L
where I is the number of incident (newly-arising) cases in a period, DW is the disability weight
attached to the disease, and L is the average duration of the disease until remission or death. The
crucial parameter here is the disability weight, which is intended to be a cardinal measure of the
severity of diﬀerent diseases or impairments, on a scale from 0, indicating perfect health, to 1,
indicating death. Disability weights are constructed by panels of healthcare providers and medical
experts using a “person trade-oﬀ” protocol which establishes utility equivalences between years of
l i f el i v e di nd i ﬀerent states of health. One year lived with a disability provides the same utility as
(1−DW) years lived disability-free (Murray, 1996). Disability weights are therefore not primarily
intended as a measure of labor supply. Nevertheless, these estimates provide at least some basis
for comparing the eﬀects of diﬀerent diseases, as well as a cross-check on the results using the ASR
parameter discussed earlier.5
Because YLD data play a signiﬁcant role in the analysis below, it is worth exploring these
data in more detail. Table 1 shows data from the WHO “AFRO E” region, (deﬁned as Africa with
high child and very high adult mortality). We look at per capita YLDs for men in the 30—44 age
group and boys aged 0—4. Overall, the men average 13.5 percent of a YLD per capita per year,
with one-third of this burden coming from infectious and parasitic diseases. HIV/AIDS makes up
5Some examples of disability weights are blindness (0.600), deafness (0.216), HIV (0.136), AIDS (0.505), tubercu-
losis sero-negative for HIV (0.264), severe iron-deﬁciency anemia (0.093), malaria episodes (0.172) and neurological
sequelae of malaria (0.473).
7half of the infectious disease burden, while the two diseases that we consider below make relatively
small contributions. Tuberculosis accounts for 0.005 YLDs, or 3.5 percent of the disability burden,
while malaria accounts for only 0.001 YLDs, or 1 percent of the total disability burden. The boys
average 16.6 percent of a YLD per capita per year, with two thirds of the burden coming from
infectious diseases.
To assess the eﬀect on worker productivity from a general health improvement (i.e., an
increase in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60) we need a mapping from life expectancy to
YLDs. We construct this mapping by looking at cross-sectional data from 14 WHO sub-regions on
YLDs per capita and life expectancy at birth. Figure 4 shows the data for the full population. In
practice, we work with similar data at the age-group level (each group spans approximately 15 years
for most of the working-age population). For each age group, we run a regression across the 14
sub-regions of YLDs per capita on life expectancy at birth. The coeﬃcients from these regressions
then tell us the change in age-speciﬁc YLDs that would result from an increase in life expectancy
from 40 to 60. To give a concrete example, the regression of YLDs per capita on life expectancy at
birth for the 30—44 age group (with standard errors in parentheses) is:
YL D=0 .251 − 0.00226 e0,R 2 =0 .88
(0.017) (0.0002)
Applying these regression coeﬃcients, a change in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60
would lower YLDs from 0.160 to 0.115. Using YLDs to measure the impact of disease on labor
input is complicated, however, by the fact that diseases at one age may result in disability at
another. For example, a crippling disease suﬀered in childhood will cause disability in adulthood.
To take account of this we make the (admittedly extreme) assumption that all YLDs incurred in
childhood result in adult disability. Speciﬁcally, we spread the YLDs incurred at ages 0—14 evenly
over adults aged 15—64. Using the regressions just described, annual YLDs for ages 0—4 fall from
0.221 to 0.148 and annual YLDs for ages 5—14 fall from 0.075 to 0.055. Thus implied YLDs at
each adult age due to childhood illness fall from 0.037 to 0.026. The implied labor input per adult
in the 30—44 age group after the health improvement relative to before the improvement is thus
(1 − 0.115 − 0.026)/(1 − 0.160 − 0.037), or a 7.0 percent increase. Similarly, the implied increases
in labor input per worker in the 15—29 and 45—59 age groups are 6.1 percent and 6.6 percent,
respectively. These eﬀects are slightly less than half the size of the eﬀe c t sw ee s t i m a t eu s i n gt h e
data on ASR. In the simulations below, we use the ASR estimates as the base case.
2.3.2 Phase-in of Health Eﬀects
Conceptually, both the ASR and YLD estimates are derived from thinking about a comparison of
workers who have spent their entire lives in a low or high life expectancy environment. However, in
response to a health intervention, there will be a long transition period in which some of the labor
force will have grown up in a poor health environment. This is important, because there is good
8evidence that many of the most important health interventions in terms of worker productivity are
those that aﬀect young children (or even in utero). Speciﬁcally, children who grow up in a more
favorable health environment are healthier in a number of measurable respects (such as height, IQ
and prevalence of chronic disease), and perform better as students and workers.
To deal with this problem of phase-in, we allow a worker’s health human capital to be a
function of both the current health environment and the health environment that prevailed when
he was born. In the case of the ASR measure, for example, human capital from health per worker




exp[(1 − η)ρASR + ηρASR0] if T>t− i
exp[ρASR0] if t − i ≥ T
where ASR and ASR0 are the adult survival rates implied by the mortality regimes prevailing before
and after the shock, ρ is the parameter that measures the eﬀect of ASR on worker productivity as
estimated by Weil (2007), and η ∈ [0,1] captures the importance of the contemporaneous health
environment in aﬀecting worker productivity. A value of η =1implies that health improvements
are fully reﬂected in worker productivity right away. A value of η =0implies that there is no
contemporaneous eﬀect of health improvement on worker productivity; the only workers who will
be more productive are those who are born after the improvement in health. At this point we have
no solid grounds for estimating the value of η, and so in our simulations we use 0.5 as our base case
value.
2.3.3 The Eﬀect of Health on Education
There are several possible channels through which changes in health may increase education. Longer
life expectancy increases the time over which investment in human capital can be amortized, and
therefore should raise investment in schooling (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000). Lower adult mortality
also reduces the number of orphans, who receive less schooling than children with living parents
(Case et al., 2004). There is some evidence that healthier children are also better able to take
advantage of schooling, for example through reduced absenteeism and greater mental alertness
while at school (Bleakley, 2007a). Children may also be kept out of school to provide care for
family members who are ill. Another channel is the so-called “quality-quantity” trade-oﬀ.I fd i s e a s e
eradication and the resulting decline in fertility result in households having fewer surviving children,
the household budget constraint — and, at the macro level, the government’s budget constraint —
may be loosened, allowing greater investment in each child (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2002).
We calibrate the eﬀect of health on schooling using estimates from Fortson (2007). Fortson
examines how the rise of HIV prevalence has aﬀected schooling in a set of seven sub-Saharan
countries. She estimates that an increase in adult HIV prevalence from zero to ten percent reduces
completed schooling by 0.5 years. Fortson also constructs a theoretical model of optimal schooling’s
response to adult mortality, which produces an eﬀect roughly two-thirds as large as the one she
9estimates.
To translate Fortson’s estimate into a form that we can use, we need to link HIV prevalence
and the mortality rate. Based on data on changes in adult mortality and HIV prevalence in her
sample, Fortson estimates that ∂mortality/∂HIV is between 0.06 and 0.09. We use the average
of these two ﬁgures, implying that HIV prevalence of ten percent would raise adult mortality by
0.0075. We can similarly translate the health shock that we are looking at into a change in the
adult mortality rate. Using our model life tables, we calculate adult mortality as the average of
age-speciﬁc mortality for all ages between 15 and 65, weighted by the age-speciﬁc population of Sri
Lanka in 1953. Adult mortality falls from 0.00972 to 0.00393 when life expectancy at birth rises





In our simulations we thus increase schooling by 0.386 years for all cohorts born after life expectancy
rises from 40 to 60. The eﬀect of this rise in schooling on the average level of human capital will
depend on the initial level of schooling because, as discussed above, the percentage return to
schooling falls with the number of years of schooling. In our base case simulation, we consider the
case where initial schooling is below four years, so that the return to schooling is 13.4 percent per
year.
2.4 Other Channels from Health to Income
There are several other potential channels from health to income that we do not pursue at this
stage.
Changes in health, particularly through changes in adult life expectancy, may also cause
changes in the savings rate. Modigliani’s classic life-cycle model of savings would suggest that an
increased probability of surviving past the age of eﬀective labor force participation would increase
savings rates in the long run. In the short run, the demographic bulge of relatively young workers
saving at a relatively high rate might also increase capital accumulation relatively shortly after the
shock. Although these mechanisms may be important, it remains diﬃcult to judge quantitatively
how important life-cycle savings eﬀects are likely to be in a developing economy. There is a lively
discussion of the evidence on these issues as they relate to Taiwan in Lee et al. (2001) and Deaton
(1999).
Reduced fertility that accompanies lower mortality will also have a positive eﬀect on labor
supply, particularly for women. This eﬀect has been explored recently by Bloom et al. (2007) for
the case of fertility declines resulting from changes in abortion laws. In the experiment we consider,
of raising life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60, the total fertility rate falls from 5.16 to 3.72. Thus,
the average woman has 1.44 fewer children in the healthy regime. However, because much of the
diﬀerence in life expectancy results from mortality at young ages, the diﬀerence in time required
10for child care is much smaller than the diﬀerence in the number of children ever born.
3 Basic Results and Sensitivity
Figure 5 shows the results of our simulation for a “base case” set of parameters. These are a
fertility adjustment period of 50 years, health impact on productivity calculated according to the
ASR methodology, a phase-in eﬀect of health on the productivity of those born before the improve-
ment (the parameter η) of one-half, initial schooling of less than four years, an economy closed
to international capital ﬂows, and a land share in the Cobb-Douglas production function of 10
percent. Figure 5 shows the levels of human capital per worker, physical capital per worker, output
per worker, and output per capita. As in all the ﬁgures that follow, we show results relative to a
baseline in which no health improvement takes place.
The evolution of human capital per worker shows a combination of the direct eﬀect of the
health shock on labor productivity, the increase in schooling due to better health, and the changing
age-structure, and therefore experience, of the workforce. The long-run eﬀect of the changed age-
structure of the workforce is to increase per worker human capital by about 2.1 percent, and that
from schooling is 6.2 percent. The long-run eﬀect of higher productivity due to health is 15.5
percent. As is clear from the ﬁgure, much of the beneﬁt of better health for human capital —
speciﬁc a l l y ,a l lo ft h es c h o o l i n ge ﬀect, half of the direct health eﬀect, and all of the experience eﬀect
— is subject to a signiﬁcant time lag.
Physical capital per worker falls following the shock mechanically because more workers
are now alive to work with the same aggregate amount of capital. Since much of the increase
in life expectancy is among the young, the cohorts entering the labor force after the shock are
substantially larger than earlier incoming cohorts. This has the eﬀect of depressing the capital
stock per worker still further. Eventually, as the size of the population stabilizes, increased savings
from the extra workers lead to a gradual recovery in the capital-labor ratio. The capital-labor ratio
reaches a minimum about thirty years after the shock, at which point it is about 10 percent lower
than it was before the shock.
The path of output per worker reﬂects the dynamics of human and physical capital per
worker, as well as land per worker (which we do not show, but which can be inferred from Figure 5).
Output per worker follows an odd path, initially rising from the improvement in worker productivity
due to better health, then falling due to capital and land dilution from faster population growth,
and eventually rising again as population growth slows and the beneﬁts of better health through
schooling and the productivity of later-born cohorts phase in. As discussed above, the demographic
dynamics of our model determine the gap between income per worker and income per capita. For
the ﬁrst 40 or so years after the health improvement, a higher dependency ratio means that income
per capita is lower relative to baseline than is income per worker. In the steady state, income per
capita is 3.2 percent higher relative to baseline than income per worker.
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capita by roughly 15 percent relative to the baseline of no health improvement. In the sense that
better health raises income, this result is a conﬁrmation of the widely accepted view that health
provides economic beneﬁts. However, both the magnitude and timing of the eﬀect are disappointing
from this perspective. An increase in life expectancy from 40 to 60 is a major health improvement,
and our simulation says that such an improvement would have a very small eﬀect on the income
gap between the typical rich and poor countries. Further, for the ﬁrst thirty years following a health
improvement, income per capita is lower than it would have been had health not improved.
We now turn to an examination of the sensitivity of these basic results to some of the
modeling choices and parameters that we have used.
3.1 The Eﬀect of Health on Productivity
As discussed above, our base case analysis uses an estimate of the eﬀect of health on labor produc-
tivity (the ASR measure) based on estimates in Weil (2007). We also have an alternative measure
of these productivity eﬀects built up from information on years of life lost to disability (the YLD
measure). Figure 6 shows the paths of output per capita following a health improvement for these
two cases, and also for the case in which we assume a zero eﬀe c to fh e a l t ho nw o r k e rp r o d u c t i v i t y .
In all cases, the paths of population, schooling, and labor force experience are the same. The YLD
results paint a more negative picture than the ASR results, because the positive eﬀect on health
human capital is only about half as large. After 15 years, income falls by more than one and a half
times as in the ASR case, and recovery is much more protracted, taking about 50 years rather than
35 years. The long-run positive eﬀect is about half as large as the ASR measure.
The fact that income per capita scarcely rises at all in the long run for the “No Health” case
indicates that the favorable eﬀects of health on schooling, experience, and the dependency ratio
alone roughly equal in magnitude to the negative eﬀect of increased population, working through
greater pressure on the ﬁxed factor.
3.2 The Phase-in of Health Improvements
In our base case, we assumed a value for η, the parameter that describes the phase-in of productivity
beneﬁts from health improvements, of one-half. This means that people already alive at the time
of an improvement in health receive half of the beneﬁt that accrues to those who are born after.
Figure 7 shows the path of income per capita in this base case along with paths for the cases of
η =0and η =1 . By construction, the steady states of these three scenarios are the same, since
eventually all of the people alive at the time of the health improvement have died.
In the case in which returns to health accrue only to those not yet born, the negative eﬀect
of health on income is little more than double the baseline case, with a fall of about 8.5 percent
after 15 years. However, the dynamics are little aﬀected, with income per capita recovering to
baseline only 5 years later than in the base case scenario.
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beneﬁts of a health shock. The positive eﬀects on human capital are large enough to entirely oﬀset
the capital shallowing that results from the larger population, with income in all years after the
shock greater than in the no-shock case, although by a very small margin for the period from 10-30
years after the shock when the capital-shallowing and dependency eﬀects are at their greatest.
3.3 The Returns to Schooling and Experience
Figures 8 and 9 highlight the role of experience and the return to schooling in the model. We show
the path of output in the base case, and then the results of setting the return to experience to zero
(holding ﬁxed the return to schooling) in Figure 8, and setting the return to schooling to diﬀerent
possible levels (holding ﬁxed the return to experience) in Figure 9. Accounting for the human
capital acquired through experience somewhat increases the amplitude of the changes following the
shock. When the experience eﬀect is deleted, output is higher than the base case during the period
from 15 to 50 years after the change in health, because during this time the average age of the
labor force is below its base-case level. After that, however, the long-run shift in the age-structure
of the population is towards slightly older workers. In the steady state, income per capita is higher
(by about 1.7 percent) in the case where experience is accounted for than in the case where it is
ignored.
In the case of education, our base case assumption was that the return to additional edu-
cation was 13.4 percent per year, which is consistent with initial education being below four years.
Indeed, this may have been reasonable for some countries at the time of the international epidemi-
ological transition, but looking forward, there are few countries in the world with education this
low today. We show alternative paths for the simulation using lower returns to education (i.e., 10.1
and 6.8 percent), and for the case where the return to education is zero.
The key point concerning all of these results is that, although the long-run eﬀects of the
shock on the economy naturally diﬀer, the dynamic eﬀects of the shock are almost identical regard-
less of the assumed returns to education. The income loss at 15 years is exactly the same (since
none of the new workers aﬀected by schooling have yet entered the labor force), and regaining the
no-shock income level occurs only 5 years later if there are no returns to schooling at all than if
there are the relatively high returns assumed in our baseline case.
3.4 The Speed of Adjustment of Fertility
Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) explain their ﬁnding that health improvements did not result in
economic growth during the international epidemiological transition by arguing that population
growth undid any direct positive eﬀects of health. In our model, these population eﬀects run
through crowding of land, temporary reductions in capital per worker, and a temporary rise of the
dependency ratio.
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fertility adjusts. The base case assumed that it would take 50 years for fertility to adjust to its
new long-run rate. Fifty years seems broadly plausible, since conventional wisdom suggests that
demographic transition typically takes place over the course of about two generations. However,
estimates of the response of fertility to mortality changes, and the lag with which they occur are
remarkably imprecise, and, moreover, subject to considerable regional variation. It is commonly
accepted, for example, that the African transition has been unusually prolonged. Transition in
Latin America and Asia, despite their massively diﬀerent social and economic circumstances, took
a similar amount of time, with widespread falls in fertility fairly apparent by the 1980s (Cleland,
2001). Therefore, the ﬁgures also show fertility adjustments that take 25 years, which is perhaps a
little closer to the historical experience of fertility adjustment in East Asia, or 75 years, which is
perhaps closer to the historical experience of Europe or the experience of some sub-Saharan African
countries in the more recent past (Lee et al., 2001). We also show the paths for the case in which
fertility adjusts instantaneously to the change in mortality and the case in which fertility does not
adjust at all for 50 years following with shock, then adjusts in one jump to the level consistent with
the pre-shock level of population growth.
Figure 10 shows the path of population size under the diﬀerent scenarios. Relative to
baseline in which there is no change in life expectancy, the long-run increases in population are
31 percent, 52 percent and 76 percent respectively as fertility takes 25, 50 and 75 years to adjust.
Diﬀerences in the rate of fertility adjustment become apparent only fairly gradually. After 25 years,
the population is 20 percent, 24 percent and 26 percent bigger in the three scenarios. After 50 years,
however, the diﬀerences are apparent, with population increase being only 27 percent in the 25-year
adjustment case, but 42 percent in the base case and over 50 percent in the 75-year adjustment
case. When fertility adjusts immediately to the change in mortality, there is still a slight increase
in population size relative to the baseline, reﬂecting higher survival beyond childbearing years.
Figure 11 shows the corresponding paths for income per capita. Not surprisingly, slower
adjustment of fertility exaggerates the short-run fall in income per capita and reduces the long-run
increase. In the gradual-adjustment scenarios, the fall in income per capita 15 years after the shock
is between 2.5 and 4 percent. Income per capita recovers to the baseline level after about 20,
35 and 45 years after the shock respectively. The long-run economic beneﬁts of improved health
are also reduced when fertility is slower to adjust. The 25-year adjustment case leads to long-run
income gains of about 18 percent, while the 75-year adjustment case raises income by only about
13 percent. These long-run eﬀects run entirely through the land-labor ratio.
The population dynamics in our model are entirely generated by our assumptions about
fertility adjustment. An interesting exercise is to see how they compare to the population dynamics
underlying Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2007) ﬁndings. As a ﬁrst step we can look at their estimate
of the eﬀect of health improvements on population size. Speciﬁcally, we look at the coeﬃcient from
a regression of change in log population size from 1940 to 1980 on the change in log life expectancy
14over the same period, where the change in life expectancy is instrumented using predicted mortality.
The coeﬃcient is 1.67 with a standard error of 0.50 (Table 8, column 1). The coeﬃcient implies
that an increase in life expectancy from 40 to 60 would raise population size by a factor of 1.97
over this 40-year period (using a coeﬃcient two standard errors below their estimate implies an
increase in population size by 31 percent after forty years). By contrast, in our base case simulation,
the eﬀect on population after 40 years is a 36 percent increase, and even allowing for a 75-year
adjustment for fertility the increase after 40 years is only 41 percent. Further, the simulation we
run is not fully comparable to the experience on which Acemoglu and Johnson base their analysis,
since we assume that the entire improvement in life expectancy takes place instantly, whereas in
reality the change was phased in (although heavily weighted toward the beginning of the period.)
Since Acemoglu and Johnson also report estimates of the share of the population under 20, we can
use this as an additional check on our experiment. Their coeﬃcient is 0.12, implying the share of
the population under 20 is 4.9 percentage points higher than otherwise under our shock. At a forty
year horizon, in our base case the share of the population under 20 peaks at 2.5 percentage points
above the pre-shock level after 15 years, but by 40 years has almost exactly reached its pre-shock
level.
What explains the failure of our simulated population to line up with Acemoglu and John-
son’s estimates? One possibility is that the health improvement being studied (for which life
expectancy is a proxy) aﬀected population not only through reduced mortality, but also through
higher fertility. Higher fertility in this story would have to be the direct result of better health (it
couldn’t be the result of higher income, since Acemoglu and Johnson ﬁnd that better health did
not raise income). Such a story has some support. For example, Lucas (2007a) ﬁnds that malaria
eradication in Sri Lanka raised fertility, which is consistent with evidence that malaria reduced
fecundity.
Another possibility is that there is something wrong with the Acemoglu and Johnson in-
strument for changes in life expectancy. If instrumented increases in life expectancy produce more
population growth than can be accounted for by the decline in mortality, it may be that the instru-
ment is correlated with the part of fertility not related to mortality. In other words, countries with
high mortality reductions might also just have high levels of fertility (or slow declines in fertility).
We do not have a particular theory that produces this correlation, but obviously if it is present it
also calls into question the other results that Acemoglu and Johnson derive regarding the eﬀect of
life expectancy on income.
To see whether our results would match the Acemoglu and Johnson results if our population
path had matched theirs, we conducted the following experiment: we used our demographic model
to ask how much fertility would have to jump up at the time of the mortality decline (assuming
that fertility then remained ﬂat) in order to match the Acemoglu-Johnson ﬁnding that (for the
mortality decline we consider) population will be 1.97 times the baseline level after 40 years. The
answer is that fertility would have to rise by a factor of 1.24. We then fed this demographic scenario
15through our economic model. The result is that output per capita at a 40 year horizon would be
20 percent below baseline (recall that in our base case scenario, output per capita at a horizon of
40 years is 2 percent above baseline). By contrast, Acemoglu and Johnson’s coeﬃcient from an
instrumented regression of log GDP per capita on log life expectancy is -1.32 (Table 9, column 1),
implying that the mortality improvement we consider would lower GDP per capita by 41 percent.
This ﬁnding suggests that diﬀerences between our ﬁndings and those of Acemoglu and Johnson are
due to diﬀerences in both demographics and non-demographic factors, in roughly equal proportions.
This is a convenient point at which to discuss the relationship between our paper and those
by Alwyn Young. Young (2005) simulates the eﬀect of the AIDS epidemic in South Africa on
per capita income, using a Solow model, along with his own econometric estimates of changes in
the participation rate and fertility, and an assumption that orphans accumulate no further human
capital after they are orphaned. This exercise, and its successor concerning sub-Saharan Africa
(Young, 2007), is similar in spirit to the present work, although, since it concerns a particular
disease, it can naturally be more precise about certain behavioral responses. Relative to our work,
however, Young is more concerned with long-run eﬀects whereas we emphasize transition paths.
Our methodological approach is also somewhat diﬀerent from that of Young, in that we rely as
heavily as possible on well-identiﬁed econometric estimates produced by other authors, rather than
on producing our own estimates.
Although the approach in Young’s papers is broadly similar to that in ours, and although
we share his assumption that reductions in health reduce human capital accumulation, we diﬀer
from him crucially in our assumptions concerning fertility. Young’s work is important and surpris-
ing because it argues that a massive increase in mortality actually reduces fertility; precisely the
opposite of the normal assumption, that increases in mortality increase fertility. Young’s views on
the eﬀect of HIV/AIDS on fertility are not uncontroversial, and Kalemli-Ozcan (2008) makes pre-
cisely the contrary argument, that the epidemic has caused an increase in fertility. There may be a
number of mechanisms at work, including a decline in the demand for unprotected sexual activity,
emphasized in Young (2005), and an independent decline in demand for children (Young, 2007).
None of the mechanisms in question, however, are likely to shed light on the response of fertility
to changes in the general infectious disease environment or to malaria or tuberculosis in particular.
For example, HIV/AIDS may reduce demand for children among infected parents concerned that
their children are likely to be orphaned young. This is unlikely to be a factor in the case of malaria,
which has relatively little eﬀect on adults in infected areas. Similarly, the long interval between
HIV infection and the development of AIDS presumably leaves more time for changes in fertility
behavior than the relatively quick onset of adult tuberculosis.
3.5 The Role of Land in the Production Function
Our base case treatment of land involved assuming both a particular functional form (Cobb-
Douglas, in other words unit elasticity of substitution) and a particular exponent on land in the
16production function. In this section we relax both of these assumptions. We adopt a CES produc-
tion function in which we can specify an elasticity of substitution between a capital-labor-technology
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If the elasticity of substitution is not unity, the ﬁxed factor’s share of national income will vary
as capital and human capital are accumulated, population grows, and technology improves. For
example if σ>1, so that other factors can substitute for the ﬁxed factor, then the ﬁxed factor’s
share of income will decline over time. Thus, one should be able to learn about the elasticity of
substitution, at least in a gross sense, by observing how the income share of the ﬁxed factor changes
over time, as A, K,a n dH accumulate.
Figure 12 shows data for doing such an analysis. The horizontal axis measures output per
worker. The data on the vertical axis is an estimate of the income share of non-reproducible factors
of production, from Caselli and Feyrer (2007).6 The Caselli and Feyrer estimates are in turn built
on data from World Bank (2005) on the values of physical capital, crop land, pasture land, and
subsoil resources. In the cross section, there is a clear negative relationship between the level of
output and the share of the ﬁxed factor. Combining the production function and the expression
for the income share of the ﬁxed factor, putting everything in per worker terms, and re-arranging,
we get:




where xi is ﬁxed resources per worker and yi is output per worker, and we are now considering
a cross-section of countries. The results (with standard errors in parentheses) from running this
regression are:
ln(φi)= −2.233 − 0.574 ln(yi/xi),R 2 =0 .56
(0.069) (0.071)
The implied value of σ, the elasticity of substitution, is 2.35 with a 95 percent conﬁdence interval
of [1.56, 3.13]. We know of few estimates of this parameter to compare to our own. Nordhaus and
Tobin (1972, Appendix B), using time series data for the US over the period 1909-1958 on capital
and labor stocks and the income share of natural resources, estimate the elasticity of substitution
6Speciﬁcally, we use αw −αk, where the former is the income share of all non-human factors and the latter is the
share of reproducible capital.
17between land and a labor-capital aggregate as 2.02.
Figure 12 is also informative about the share of ﬁxed factors in national income. Our base
case, in which the land share is 10 percent, is probably quite conservative for most developing
countries. Other evidence also suggests this. In a well-known study, Hansen and Prescott (2002)
assume a value of 30 percent for pre-industrial economies. Accordingly, a sensitivity analysis that
increases land’s share of national income to 20 or even 30 percent seems reasonable for at least
some developing countries.
The production function can be re-written to show how total output compares at two points




















To do this comparison one does not need to know the quantity of the ﬁxed factor X or the parameter
a, but only the income share of the ﬁxed factor at a point in time, the elasticity of substitution, and
the growth of the inputs into production, all of which we were already measuring. We use a value
of α = 1
3, which is consistent with our earlier parameterization of giving capital a 0.3 exponent
when the land share is 10 percent.
F i g u r e1 3s h o w sh o wt h er e s u l t so ft h em o d e la r ea l t e r e dw h e nt h ei n c o m es h a r eo fl a n d
is increased from 10 percent to 20 and 30 percent. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
three simulations in GDP per capita following the shock. In comparison to the base case, it takes
income an additional 15 years to recover to its pre-shock level under a 20 percent income share of
land. A recovery never occurs when land’s share is 30 percent. The simulations also have markedly
diﬀerent implications for the long-run gains from improvements in health. For instance, doubling
the share of land more than halves the long-run gains in per capita income from improved health,
which go from about 16 percent to 6 percent. Naturally, the longer fertility takes to adjust, the
more pronounced this eﬀect will be.
We now turn to the elasticity of substitution between the ﬁxed factor and other inputs to
production. Intuitively, the greater this substitutability, the less severe will be the consequences of
increased population pressure on the ﬁxed factor following the shock. Figure 14 shows how varying
the elasticity parameter σ inﬂuences our ﬁndings by comparing our base case scenario with results
obtained under σ =0 .75, where land is more complementary than in the Cobb-Douglas case, and
under σ =2 , where land is more substitutable. While it takes income per capita about 50 years
following the shock to recover to its pre-shock level under σ =0 .75, this recovery occurs in 25 years
when land is twice as substitutable as in the Cobb-Douglas case. Moreover, the long-run gains
in income per capita also increase with greater substitutability of the ﬁxed factor, rising from 16
percent to 24 percent as the elasticity of substitution doubles from unity in the Cobb-Douglas case.
Finally, we consider a case that may be relevant for many resource rich developing countries,
in which there is a large resource extraction sector that is largely detached from the rest of the
18economy. Speciﬁcally, we set the resource share in national income to 40 percent and the elasticity
of substitution between resources and other inputs to inﬁnity. Coincidentally, these two changes
almost exactly cancel each other out, so that the path of income looks very similar to our base
case. Income per capita has the same initial dip as in the base case, and regains its initial baseline
after 30 years, as compared to 35 years in the base case. After 50 years, income per capita is 9.0
percent above baseline, as compared to 6.5 percent in the base case.
3.6 International Capital Flows
An important part of our results is driven by the assumption of Solovian saving. It is possible to
adjust this assumption in a straightforward way even without building a life-cycle savings model,
simply by assuming that the economy is open to international capital ﬂo w st h a te q u a l i z et h er e t u r n
to capital around the world, at least up to a country ﬁxed eﬀect.7
Figures 15 (capital per worker) and 16 (income per capita) show that allowing for capital
ﬂows (assuming a ﬁxed world interest rate) does indeed signiﬁcantly change the results.8 In the
closed economy case, capital per worker falls monotonically to a minimum of about 90 percent of
baseline thirty years after the shock. In the open economy case, capital per worker stays close to
the no-shock case over the ﬁrst couple of decades after the shock. This is because the eﬀects of
increased human capital, which draws capital per worker into the economy, are still only phasing
in, while there is a signiﬁcant drag on returns to capital from the presence of the ﬁxed factor. From
about twenty-ﬁve years after the shock, however, the eﬀects of increased human capital begin to
make themselves felt more strongly, and the capital stock quickly converges to its long-run level,
about 13 percent higher than in the no-shock baseline. Thirty-ﬁve years after health improvement,
income per capita is 5 percent above the baseline path in the case of an economy open to capital
ﬂows, while it has barely regained the baseline level in the closed economy. Even 65 years after the
shock, income per capita is 5 percent higher in the open economy than in the economy reliant on
domestic savings.
The most important question to ask about this case is whether capital ﬂows of the magnitude
envisaged could be sustained by developing economies. Figure 17 shows the resulting current
account deﬁcit as a percentage of GDP, and Figure 18 the size of foreign capital required over the
period, both as a percentage of GDP and of total capital. The current account deﬁcit resulting
from this source of capital inﬂow spikes at 2.5 percent of GDP in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after the shock,
as the productivity of current workers jumps from the improvement in health. The current account
7Caselli and Feyrer (2007) make a strong case that marginal products of capital are almost completely equalized
around the world.
8We simulate international capital ﬂows in the following manner. Prior to the health-improvement shock, capital
accumulates in the usual closed-economy Solovian fashion. Note that this is equivalent to assuming that the economy
is open to international capital ﬂows but has a domestic savings rate such that there is no inﬂow in the pre-shock
steady state. In other words, the marginal product of domestic capital in the pre-shock steady state is equal to the
ﬁxed world interest rate. Once the shock is applied, however, capital accumulates in such a fashion as to maintain
its pre-shock steady-state marginal product over time.
19deﬁcit then declines for a decade before rising to about one percent of GDP for several decades due
to the health-induced rise in population growth. The ratio of foreign debt to GDP peaks about
half a century after the shock, at about 25 percent (equivalent to 15 percent of the capital stock).
While these numbers are probably manageable in themselves, they are not small increments to the
respective measures, so could well be diﬃcult to sustain in countries with substantial accumulated
debt, whether public or private. Accordingly, the open economy results highlight the importance
of maintaining institutions and policies favorable to foreign investment, including, but not limited
to, avoiding substantial government indebtedness.
3.7 “Best Case” and “Worst Case” Scenarios
T h er e a d e rc a ns e ef r o mt h ea b o v ee x e r c i s e sh o wv a r ying individual assumptions of our simulation
model aﬀects the results. Obviously it is possible to vary more than one assumption at a time, and
the eﬀects of doing this will not likely be simply a sum of the results from varying them individually.
There is no problem running such scenarios through our simulator. The diﬃculty is in summarizing
the immense number of potential results. Here we consider two scenarios of interest.
We start by considering a “best case” for the eﬀects of health on growth. That is, we
choose parameters that give the largest eﬀect of health on growth while at the same time being
reasonable within the framework that we have constructed. Speciﬁcally, compared to the base case,
we make the following adjustments. We set the speed of fertility adjustment to 25 years, set the
elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs to 2 (keeping the land share in national
income at 10 percent), and consider the case of an economy open to capital ﬂows from abroad.
We leave the treatment of experience and schooling at their base case values (the latter is already
arguably optimistic). Finally, for the eﬀect of health on worker productivity, we assume a value of
η =1 , implying that improvements in health are reﬂected in worker productivity right away. In this
scenario, income per capita rises immediately by 10 percent in response to the health improvement
as shown in Figure 19. After 40 years, income is 21 percent above baseline, and in the steady state
income is 25 percent higher than baseline. Compared to the base case, the best case scenario tells
as i g n i ﬁcantly more positive story about the ability of health improvements to raise the standard
of living. This being said, however, even in this case the response of income to health is far lower
than one would expect from popular pronouncements on the issue.
The second scenario we consider is a “worst case,” designed to minimize the eﬀect of health
on economic growth, again subject to the constraint of picking parameters that seem to us somewhat
reasonable. Speciﬁcally, we set the speed of fertility adjustment to 75 years, land’s exponent in the
production function to 0.3, the elasticity of substitution between land and other factors to one, and
the parameter governing the phase-in of productive eﬀects of health (η) at zero, implying that only
those born after the health improvement have increased productivity. We consider the case of an
economy closed to international capital ﬂows. Finally, we use the “YLD” method for calculating
the productive beneﬁts of better health, rather than the “ASR” method used in our standard
20simulations. Figure 20 shows the results. With these parameters, our standard improvement in
health lowers income per capita not only in the short run (as in the base case scenario) but in the
long run as well. At a 40 year horizon, income per capita is 13.4 percent below its baseline path.
Although this scenario certainly contradicts the conventional wisdom that health improvements
lead to economic growth, it still does not match the ﬁndings of Acemoglu and Johnson (2007).
Recall that in their analysis, the mortality improvement considered here would lower GDP per
capita by 41 percent after 40 years.
4 Disease Eradication
Thus far in the paper, the health improvement that we have been considering has been an increase
in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60 years, which is meant to roughly match the international
epidemiological transition that took place in the decades following World War II. The components
of that transition included the widespread availability of antibiotics, new vaccines, the use of DDT,
and the creation of public health infrastructure in a large number of countries. The improvement
in life expectancy resulted from progress against many diﬀerent diseases which aﬀected individuals
at diﬀerent ages and had varying eﬀects on labor productivity and human capital accumulation.
We now turn to examine the eﬀects of more speciﬁc health improvements. That is, we look
at the eﬀects of eradicating speciﬁc diseases. We also adopt a prospective, rather than historical
approach. In other words, we start from the current health conditions and ask how things would
change if the disease environment were altered. The pairing of the disease-speciﬁc and prospective
approaches (and similarly the general health and historical approaches) is not a logical necessity. We
could use our model to ask about general health improvements starting from the current situation,
or similarly about what the eﬀect was of progress against speciﬁc diseases in the past. We adopt
the approach we do out of considerations of data availability and policy relevance.
The two diseases we consider are malaria and tuberculosis. Both are major killers in de-
veloping countries, and both are at the center of recent international eﬀorts. (The third disease
that naturally falls into this category is HIV/AIDS. However, this disease presents a number of
c o m p l i c a t i o n st h a tm a k ei tt o od i ﬃcult for us to deal with for now.) In both cases, we consider
the eﬀect of immediately eradicating the disease in question. Disease reductions that fell short of
complete eradication, or which were phased in gradually, would obviously have eﬀects that were
smaller than those shown here.
We apply our model to demographic data from Zambia, which is fairly representative of
sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. In 2001, its life expectancy at birth was 37 years. Malaria was
the cause of about 8.3 percent of deaths in Zambia, compared with a sub-Saharan average of 9.8
percent. Tuberculosis was a little more severe than the sub-Saharan average, causing about 3.1
percent of deaths compared with 2.0 percent on average.
Eradicating tuberculosis raises life expectancy at birth from 37.0 years to 38.0 years. Elim-
21inating malaria would raise life expectancy at birth to 38.6 years. These gains in life expectancy
at birth are very small compared to the 20 years that characterized the international demographic
transition in the previous experiment. Their economic eﬀects will naturally also be substantially
smaller.
Applying our simulation model to speciﬁc diseases requires several modiﬁcations. When we
considered general improvements in health, we used data on mortality (that is, life expectancy at
birth) as an indicator of morbidity, that is, how healthy the surviving population was. Individual
diseases, however, will not have the same relative eﬀects on morbidity and mortality as the general
health improvement that we considered above. For example, among adults, malaria has a large
eﬀect on morbidity relative to mortality. Thus when we consider individual diseases, we de-couple
morbidity and mortality. We use direct measures of the morbidity eﬀects of individual diseases
as well as their age-speciﬁcm o r t a l i t yp r o ﬁles. We also alter our treatment of the eﬀect of disease
prevalence on school completion (in the case of malaria, but not tuberculosis), to take advantage
of good estimates of this particular eﬀect.
The pieces of our model other than demographics, productivity eﬀects of disease, and school-
ing eﬀects of disease are the same as those discussed above.
4.1 Demographic Eﬀects of Disease Eradication
The pre-shock mortality regime is generated from life table data for Zambia in 2001, obtained
from the WHO. To simulate the appropriate shocks, we use data from the WHO on disease-speciﬁc
deaths to create the corresponding cause-deleted life tables, which are then applied in the respective
scenarios to project the population from the shock period (i.e., year 0) onward.9 For pre-shock
fertility, we use age-speciﬁc fertility rates reported for Zambia in 2001 by the US Census Bureau’s
International Data Base.
Figure 21 shows the level of the population following the eradication of the diseases. Since
malaria accounts for a greater fraction of mortality than tuberculosis, and this mortality is concen-
trated at younger ages, not surprisingly the increase in population resulting from its eradication is
also larger: about 5 percent in the long run compared with about 2.7 percent in the long run for
tuberculosis. In both cases, around 80 percent of the extra population growth occurs in the ﬁrst
forty years after the shock.
Figure 22 shows the most substantial economic diﬀerence in the eﬀect of eliminating the two
diseases. Eliminating malaria causes the dependency ratio to increase by about 2.6 percent over
the following 15 years, while eliminating tuberculosis causes the dependency ratio to fall more or
less continuously for the next 60 years, including on impact. It is worth noting that the dependency
ratio implied by the Zambian life tables is signiﬁcantly higher before the shock than that implied by
9Strictly, we scale data on age-speciﬁc causes of death in sub-Saharan Africa by the population prevalence of that
cause of death in Zambia compared with sub-Sah a r a nA f r i c aa saw h o l e ,s i n c ed a t ao na g e - s p e c i ﬁcc a u s e so fd e a t hi n
Zambia are not available.
22the South Asian model life tables in the earlier experiment. Before the shock, the dependency ratio
is about 0.95 using these life tables, compared with only about 0.69 in the previous experiment.
4.2 The Direct Eﬀect of Disease on Labor Productivity
To measure the eﬀects of eradicating speciﬁc diseases on labor productivity, we use data on age-
speciﬁc disease prevalence from the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) project (Murray and Lopez,
1996). The data apply to sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of malaria, we look at both episodes of
the disease and the neurological sequelae that result from cerebral malaria in children under ﬁve.
Prevalence is deﬁned as the fraction of a year that the average person in an age group experiences
a disease. In the case of malaria episodes, for example, 17.5 percent of adults experience an episode
every year, but duration is quite short, so the prevalence of the disease is only one-quarter of one
percent. By contrast neurological sequelae have no incidence among adults, but a prevalence of
more than half a percent because they last a lifetime.
In principle, the data on prevalence should be combined with a disability weight to produce
a measure of how much of the adult population’s labor input is lost due to a particular disease.
However, as discussed above, we are not fully conﬁdent that the disability weights used by the GBD
project, which are meant to measure the utility cost of diseases, are appropriate as measures of the
eﬀect of disease on labor input. Further, as will be seen below, our results show extremely small
economic eﬀects of disease eradication. Thus, we err on the conservative side and simply assign
a disability weight of one to malaria (both episodes and sequelae) and tuberculosis. That is, we
assume that an aﬀected individual supplies no labor input at all.
Our direct observation of disease prevalence eliminates the need to make assumptions about
the phase-in of productive beneﬁts from health improvements (the parameter η)t h a tw ed i di n
the case of general health. The duration of malaria episodes is very short, and even episodes
of tuberculosis have a duration short enough that we can ignore it in examining the eﬀects of
eradication. Thus we assume that upon impact, the prevalence of malaria episodes and tuberculosis
go to zero; in the case of malaria sequelae, we assume that children born after eradication are free
of sequelae, while those born before retain the pre-eradication prevalence as they age.
4.3 The Eﬀect of Disease Eradication on Schooling
Several papers have examined the eﬀect of malaria and its eradication on both schooling and
human capital accumulation more generally. This is for several reasons. First, malaria exerts a
particularly heavy burden on children; in areas where malaria is endemic, adults develop partial
immunity. Second, there have been several cases in which malaria has been rapidly eradicated or at
least greatly reduced. These cases provide good identifying variation that can be used to estimate
malaria’s eﬀects.
Lucas (2007a) examines malaria eradication in Sri Lanka. Rapid deployment of DDT in
the years after World War II, along with pre-existing variation in malaria intensity that resulted
23from climate factors allow for a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences comparison of education in cohorts born
before and after eradication. The measure of malaria in her data is the “spleen rate,” which is the
percentage of school-age children with palpably enlarged spleens. She estimates that reducing the
spleen rate from 100 percent to zero would raise primary education by 1.79 years.
Spleen rate is no longer used as a measure of malaria. Lucas (2007b) reports the malaria
incidence rate in Zambia in 1999 as 33.1 percent. She also uses time series data from Sri Lanka to
estimate a mapping from incidence to spleen rates, which implies that Zambia in 1999 had a spleen
rate of 10.3 percent. Multiplying this spleen rate by Lucas’ coeﬃcient says that eradicating malaria
in Zambia would increase years of primary school by 0.18 years. Recall that our estimate was that
an increase in general health that raised life expectancy at birth by 20 years raised schooling by
0.386 years, and that we estimate that the eradication of malaria would raise life expectancy by
only 1.6 years. Thus the eﬀect of malaria on education is indeed greatly out of proportion to its
eﬀect on life expectancy.10
The relatively large eﬀect on schooling of eradicating malaria that we get from Lucas is
supported by the estimates in several other papers. Bleakley (2007b) estimates even larger eﬀects
of malaria on individual income and schooling. He estimates that, per infection, malaria reduces
income by about 40 percent, with about one-quarter of that eﬀect coming from schooling — that
is, roughly one year of schooling per malaria infection. With an incidence rate in Zambia of about
one-third, the implied gain in average years of schooling is about one-quarter, which is quite similar
to the Lucas estimate we use above.
4.4 Disease Eradication Eﬀects on Income per Capita
Figure 23 shows the paths of income per capita in the two eradication scenarios, compared to a
baseline in which there is no change to health. The long-run eﬀects are roughly similar: income per
capita rises by 2 percent. The short-run paths are quite diﬀerent, however. In the case of malaria
eradication, income per capita initially dips to almost 1.5 percent below its pre-eradication level,
and does not get back to its pre eradication level until some 40 years into the simulation. In the
case of tuberculosis, by contrast, income rises immediately.
The diﬀering demographic impact of the two diseases is part of the explanation for the
divergent income paths. As Figure 24 shows, income per worker falls less in response to malaria
eradication than does income per capita because of the increase in dependency that malaria eradi-
cation produces. In the long run, income per worker is higher for malaria eradication than in the
case of tuberculosis eradication, but income per capita is equalized because the population with
tuberculosis eradicated has a higher percentage of working-age adults. There are also interesting
10Lucas also ﬁnds that malaria eradication had a positive eﬀect on fertility on impact. She shows that this eﬀect
worked through increased probability of a ﬁrst birth, suggesting that the biological eﬀect of malaria eradication in
raising fecundity (the ability to have a child) was more important than any decline in desired fertility due to higher
child survival. We do not incorporate this eﬀect in our simulations, but if we did it would clearly lower the economic
beneﬁts of malaria eradication.
24diﬀerences in the path of capital per worker, as shown in Figure 25. Capital per worker declines
immediately in the case of tuberculosis eradication, since fewer working-age adults are dying. There
is a larger, but more delayed decline in capital per worker in the case of malaria eradication as the
cohort of children who would have died from the disease enter the labor force.
The other source of the diﬀerence in the dynamic responses to eradication of malaria and
tuberculosis is how they aﬀect human capital. This is shown in Figure 26. In the case of tuberculosis,
the biggest eﬀect of eradication is on the productivity of workers. Table 2 shows that the prevalence
of tuberculosis among adults is around 0.6 percent. Eradicating the disease immediately frees up
this productive labor. By contrast, the prevalence of malaria episodes among adults is much lower,
and eradicating malaria has only a delayed eﬀect on the prevalence of neurological sequelae among
adults. The part of the human capital increase that results from increased schooling, and thus
takes a generation or more to phase in, is much higher for malaria. Malaria eradication raises
schooling by 0.18 years, which accounts for most of the long-run increase in human capital from
eradication. The increase in schooling from eradicating tuberculosis is only 0.09 years. Finally,
eradicating tuberculosis reduces mortality mainly amongst prime-age workers, thereby skewing the
age distribution of the population towards relatively more experienced workers. As a result, the
long-run increase in human capital in the form of experience is about 4 times as great as that of
eradicating malaria.
The most important things to note about our estimates is that the economic beneﬁts of
disease reduction are both small and, in the case of malaria, long in coming. These results stand in
stark contrast to the assessments of the economic eﬀects of malaria discussed in the introduction.
The discussion of the sensitivity of our results to altering the parameterization of the model,
conducted in Section Three in the case of general health improvement, can be carried over to this
examination of individual diseases. Changing our assumptions about land’s role in production, the
openness of the economy to capital ﬂows, and the speed of fertility adjustment can increase the
estimated beneﬁts of disease reductions, but not by enough to match the estimates quoted above.
As we did for the general improvement in health analyzed earlier in the paper, we can
examine the eﬀect of disease eradication under a “best case” set of parameters that maximize
(within reason) the eﬀect of health on income per capita.11 The results are shown in Figure 27.
For malaria, income per capita returns to its baseline level after 25 years, rather than 40 years in
the base case, and the total rise is 3 percent, versus 2 percent in the base case. The results for
tuberculosis are qualitatively similar. Even in this best case, our results show an economic eﬀect
of disease eradication that is quite small.
As in our analysis of the eﬀect of a general improvement in health, not every possible
channel by which malaria or tuberculosis aﬀect the economy is included in our analysis. In the case
of malaria, two eﬀects that are often mentioned are, ﬁrst, reductions in agricultural productivity
that result from farmers choosing land and/or crops in order to avoid exposure to the disease, and
11The best case assumptions are the same as in Section 3, except that we do not make an assumption about the
speed of phase-in of health improvements (η) when we are dealing with disease eradication.
25second, the eﬀect of even low levels of disease in preventing some industries, most notably tourism,
from getting started in a region. Beyond this, it may be that frequent absences produced by malaria
result in a reduction in productivity that is greatly out of proportion to the number of days lost.
We do not have good ways of incorporating any of these eﬀects into our simulations.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Using a simulation model, we explore the economic eﬀects of an exogenous change in population
health. The model allows for a direct eﬀect of health on worker productivity, as well as indirect
eﬀects that run through schooling, the size and age-structure of the population, capital accumu-
lation, and crowding of ﬁxed natural resources. We also model the dynamic processes of phase-in
of health improvements and the adjustment of fertility to a change in mortality that accompanies
better health. Our analysis shows that for reasonable parameters, the period before any beneﬁcial
eﬀects of an improvement in health are visible in GDP per capita can be quite long, on the order
of a third of a century. It may take twice that long to achieve most of the long-run gains in income
per capita resulting from increased health. Further, these gains are surprisingly small. An increase
in life expectancy at birth from 40 to 60, in our base case simulation, raises GDP per capita by
roughly 15 percent in the long run. When we examine the economic eﬀects of eradicating speciﬁc
diseases, we get similar results: eliminating either malaria or tuberculosis in the typical country in
sub-Saharan Africa would raise GDP per capita by only two percent in the long run.
Our simulation model is parameterized using a combination of microeconomic estimates of
the eﬀect of health on schooling and worker productivity, data on demographics and disease burdens
in developing countries, aggregate measures of the natural resource share in national income, and
standard components of quantitative macroeconomic theory. The paper discusses how variations
in the parameterization of the economic environment aﬀect our results. No reasonable variation
that we could come up with produces economic gains from health improvements of the magnitude
that are commonly found in policy discussions of this issue.
The long lag with which health aﬀects income per capita, along with the relatively modest
long-run eﬀect, may explain one of the more puzzling phenomena regarding cross-country inequality.
While cross-country inequality in health declined rapidly over the period 1950—1990 (that is, up
through the advent of the AIDS epidemic), cross-country inequality in income did not.
The results from our analyses of health’s eﬀect on economic growth will have a number
of uses. Considerations of economic eﬀects are already an important part of discussions of and
advocacy for programs to improve population health. While health improvements may well raise
worker productivity, many potential interventions in developing countries will also be accompanied
by the side eﬀect of a rapidly growing population, which will have negative economic eﬀects over a
signiﬁcant time horizon. An understanding of the demographic dynamics that accompany health
improvements therefore suggests complementary policies and investments. Encouraging foreign
26investment may help mitigate capital dilution arising from population pressure. Planning for extra
teachers and extra schooling facilities to cope with a likely large increase in the number of school-
age children would mitigate adverse eﬀects of crowding on human capital accumulation. Similarly,
family-planning policies involving education or the availability of modern contraceptive methods
are likely to limit the extent of population growth. Policies such as these can greatly improve the
rate at which improvements in health are translated into improvements in the standard of living.
It is appropriate, though, to end on a note of caution. That improvements in health may
temporarily (or even permanently) reduce income per capita is not a reason not to pursue such
improvements, which are valuable in themselves. Similarly, family-planning policies need to be
considered in the context of welfare analysis rather than simply through the lens of their eﬀects
on income per capita. This study is therefore complementary to the consideration of the welfare
analysis of development policies, not a substitute for it.
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29Table 1: Per Capita YLDs for Males, AFRO E Region
Ages 0—4 Ages 30—44
All Causes 0.1662 0.1352
Communicable, Maternal, Perinatal and Nutritional Conditions 0.1084 0.0406




Non-communicable Diseases 0.0450 0.0717
Injuries 0.0129 0.0228
Source: WHO, Global Burden of Disease (2002) Revised Estimates
Table 2: Disease Burden for Females, Sub-Saharan Africa
Age Incidence Rate Prevalence Rate Average Duration Death Rate
(per 100,000) (per 100,000) (years) (per 100,000)
Malaria Episodes
0—4 120,000 1,644 0.01 559
5—14 17,500 240 0.01 42
15—44 17,500 240 0.01 33
45—59 17,500 240 0.01 36
Malaria — Neurological Sequelae
0—4 164 365 37.1 0
5—14 0 701 - -
15—44 0 617 - -
45—59 0 474 - -
Tuberculosis (HIV sero-negative)
0—4 85 108 2.0 42
5—14 135 251 2.0 22
15—44 284 552 2.0 92
45—59 339 670 2.0 182
Source: Murray and Lopez (1996)
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Figure 4: YLD per Capita and Life Expectancy at Birth
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